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CORPORATIONS
DIVIDENDS- To WHOM PAYABLE WHEN RECORD DATE IS
GIVEN
X was the life beneficiary of a trust created by the will of her
husband. Included in the trust estate were a number of shares of stock
in the A Corporation. The A Corporation declared a dividend on
January 31, 1939, payable in four quarterly instalments to shareholders
of record on four different dates. X died after the payment of the first
instalment, but before the record date for the second instalment. The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and held that the remainderman of the trust was entitled to
the dividends instead of the estate of the life beneficiary. The court
relied on the so-called Connecticut rule and said that where a dividend
is declared payable to stockholders of record on a stated future date it
is the property of the owner of the stock on that date.'
Dividends are declared in several ways. The directors may simply
declare a dividend with no mention of a date for payment,' or they
may include not only a date for payment, but a record date. Before
the record date problem arose the courts with very few exceptions held
that dividends belonged to the owner of the stock on the date the divi-
dend was declared.3 However the practice of most corporations today
is to declare the dividend to be payable to shareholders on a date of
record between the declaration date and the date set for payment.' The
original purpose of such a practice was undoubtedly to protect the cor-
poration, so that when it paid a dividend to the person registered on the
books on the record date no liability would fall on the corporation if
such person were not the actual owner on that date. However many
courts have held that the record date is the effective date of the dividend
and the actual owner on the date of record is entitled to the dividend
even though he may not be the owner registered on the books of the
corporation.' Some courts have not accepted this view and retain the
'In re Wuichet, 538 Ohio St. 97, - N.E. (2d) - (194).
' Northwestern Marble & Tile Co. v. Carlson, 116 Minn. 438, 133 N.W. 5054, Ann.
Cas. 1913B, 55z (19xz); Wallin v. Johnson City Lumber & Mfg. Co., 136 Tenn. 124,
188 S.W. 577, L.R.A. 19 17B, 323 (19z6).
'Bright v. Lord, 51 Ind. 272, sg Am. Rep. 732 (875); Lobacco Co. v. Chaffin,
193 Ky. 225, 235 S.W. 675 (1925); Hopper v. Sage, 552 N.Y. 530, 20 N.E. 350, 8 Am.
St. Rep. 771 (z889). Annotation: 6o A.L.R. 703.
" CONYNGTON, CORPORJATION PROCEDURE (Rev. Ed. 1927), 894; 38 HAsv. L. REv.
245 (1924). The practice of making the record date antedate the declaration date was
held improper in Lunt v. Cenesce Valley Trust Co., 162 N.Y. Misc. 859 (5937).5 Smith v. Taecker, 133 Calif. App. 351, 24 Pac. (2d) 18z (5933); Richter & Co.
v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 At]. 6oo (1922); Buchanan v. National Savings & Trust
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rule that title vests on the date of the declaration.' The numerical
majority follows the reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court in
Richter & Co. v. Light,' whereas the minority in number is led by
New Jersey. The departure from the general rule has been attributed
to the Connecticut court, although the doctrine had its foundations in
several previous cases.' The court in the Richter case said that where
by the terms of the resolution the dividend is made payable as of a
record date the dividends are not to vest until that date, and it makes
no difference that the owner is not actually on the books of the corpora-
tion as the owner. As long as he has title to the stock on the record
date he is entitled to the dividend. The principle of the Connecticut
rule is generally recognized in stock transactions and is embodied in
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange,' the New York Curb
Exchange,' 0 and the Chicago Stock Exchange." When stock is sold
on these exchanges any dividend declared as of a record date goes with
the stock until that date.
The New York rule has resulted from a refusal to depart from the
general rule regarding vesting of dividends which rule was formed
before the use of record dates became prevalent. For several reasons the
general rule was the most practical under the then existing circum-
stances, but the courts following the New York rule do not recognize
that the situation now is inherently different. Several years ago a note
ably presented the arguments for the rule.' 2 The writer stated several
objections to the Connecticut rule which he said were not present in
the New York rule,' 3 but it seems from the gist of that note and other
Co., 23 Fed. (zd) 994- (1928)i Ford v. Ford Mfg. Co., 222 Ill. Asrn. 76 (i925); Nutter
v. Andrews, z6 Mass. 224, 142 N.E. 67 (1923); Burroughs v. North Carolina R. Co.,
67 N.Car. 366 (187Z); In re Wuichet, 138 Ohio St. 97, - N.E. (2d) - (x94').
FLETCHER CYc. CORP. (Perm. Ed.) sec. 5380.
'Ford v. Snook, 2o5 App. Div. 194, 194 N.Y. Supp. 630 (19Z3); In re Booth's
Estate, 139 N.Y. Misc. 253, 248 N.Y. Supp. 264 (931); In re Wolf's Estate, x55 N.Y.
Misc. 190, 279 N.Y. Supp. 6o5 (1935); Western Securities Co. v. Silver King Consoli-
dated Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 19z Pac. 664 (1920); Beattie v. Gedney, 99 N.J. Eq.
207, 132 Atl. 652 (x926). The case of Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Warrous,
1o9 Conn. 268 (1929) supports the New York rule, but only because a New York corpo-
ration was involved.
797 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 6oo (szz).
'Burroughs v. North Carolina R. Co., 67 N.Car. 366 (1872); Ford v. Ford Mfg.
Co., 2z Ill. App. 76 (19z).
'New York Exchange: Rules, Chapt. VI, sec. 2.
"o New York Curb Exchange: Rules, Chapt. VI. sec. z.
' Chicago Stock Exchange: By-Laws, Article VII, secs. s and 2.
3 27 GEo. L.J. 74 (I938)-
"Briefly his objections to the Connecticut rule are that: . It is erroneously grounded
upon custom rather than established legal principles. z. It results in a conflict of laws in
the jurisdictions that follow it. 3. It is merely a minority exception to the general rules.
4. It confuses business practices, corporate reporting, and stock transactions.
authorities on the subject that the foundation of the rule is stare decisis.
The rule is not supported by present business practices.
While it is probable that the real intent on the part of the board
of directors in making dividends payable on a record date is to protect the
corporation, there is no reason why the record date cannot also be
adopted as the date upon which the title to a dividend will vest. The
rules of all the leading stock exchanges in this country are in accord
with such a construction, which would seem to indicate a customary
business practice which courts should consider in the dividend cases.
Due to the importance of the stock exchange rules in New York,
the legislature of that state passed section 62 of their Stock Corporations
Act which in effect accords sanction to the exchange rule on dividends.
The statute in very definite terms states that the directors can provide
for a record date and that only the stockholders of record on that date
shall be entitled to receive the dividend. Whether this statute meant
to go further than the exchange rule and require that only the record
owner shall be entitled to the dividend is not clear because there have
been no cases on this point under the statute, but it is clear that the
record date is the effective date instead of the declaration date. Since
the passage of this law there have been only three decisions on the point
in New York. One was in the courts prior to the passage of the law, 4
another involved a foreign corporation and therefore the statute did
not apply, " and the third case involved a declaration of a dividend as
of a date of record prior to the declaration date. 6 Thus there have
been no cases actually in point since the statute was enacted seeming
to indicate that it has been accepted as the law in New York. If this
is correct the support of New York has been taken away from the New
York rule leaving only New Jersey and Utah following the rule. Since
the Richter case in 1922 but one decision has been handed down out-
side of New York upholding the New York rule, 7 whereas there have
been five jurisdictions adopting the view of the Connecticut court.'" It
would seem clear that the majority of states, both in number and
importance, favors the Connecticut rule, and that the trend is increas-
ingly in that direction.
G. 0. A.
"I1n re Booth's Estate, 139 N.Y. Misc. 253, 248 N.Y. Supp. 630 (1923).
"ln re ,Volf's Estate, i5S N.Y. Misc. 190, 279 N.Y. Supp. 6o (x935).
'Lunt v. Genessee Valley Trust Co., 16z N.Y. Misc. 8S9 (1937); supra note 4-
" Beattie v. Gedney, 99 N.J. Eq. 207, 132 At!. 6S2 (1926)i supra note 6.
"California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and the District of Columbia.
NOTES AND COMMENTS 439
